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Abstract: Since its establishment as a nation-state after World War II, North Korea has undermined regional stability and has 
increased the threat to global security. The North Korean regime has shown time and time again that it will stop at nothing to 
maintain its power and portray itself as a strong and prosperous nation. Today the worry over North Korea extends well beyond 
its substantial conventional firepower—its asymmetric gains in chemical, biological, nuclear, and cyber warfare capabilities 
have given rise to a new set of complexities that frustrate international accord. Kim Jong-Un, North Korea’s current Supreme 
Leader, has pressed vehemently against the challenges he perceives from adversaries, both foreign as well as domestic, in order 
to promote his nation’s self-interest. As a consequence, the international community typically responds in kind with political 
and economic sanctions intended to curb further North Korean provocations. However, history has repeatedly shown how such 
sanctions serve as merely temporary measures that postpone continued advances in North Korea’s military effectiveness. In 
this paper, the authors leverage system dynamics to better characterize the current situation in North Korea and attempt to 
provide useful insights into understanding why the Kim Jong-Un regime behaves in the way that it does. By doing so, the 
authors encourage policy makers to employ system dynamics as a foreign policy tool to come up with more effective ideas and 
solutions for dealing with today’s North Korean dilemma. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 A History of Conflict with North Korea 
 
North Korea began with a troubled history and continues to remain locked in a vicious cycle of militant actions that 
jeopardizes global stability and security. North Korea’s origins as a nation-state began at the end of World War II in 1945, after 
US-led troops secured the southern part of the Korean peninsula while Soviet-led troops occupied the area north of the 38th 
parallel (Pruitt, 2013). Crafted by two US military officers on August 14, 1945, the line dividing Korea in half was merely 
intended to form temporary occupational zones (Fry, 2013). However, the emergence of the Cold War added considerable 
significance to the infamous 38th parallel, as both the US and the USSR wanted to strengthen their own influence on the 
peninsula. Distrust between the two former allies as well as the need to bolster their nascent foreign powers prevented both the 
US and USSR from deciding on a single unifying leader for all of Korea. As a result, the USSR selected Kim Il-Sung as the 
leader of the north, while the United Nations General Assembly, urged by the US, pushed for the inauguration of the Republic 
of Korea, free elections, and a constitutional framework in the south (Pruitt, 2013). As democratic principles espoused by the 
US slowly began to take shape in the south, in the north the communist government quickly set up a “Concentrated Guidance 
Campaign” that rounded up and executed citizens who failed to pledge fidelity to the new leadership which began to deify Kim 
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Il-Sung inside the minds of its faithful North Korean subjects. As a result of the purges and the resistance of those who did not 
accept the idea being ruled by a “God-king,” approximately 800,000 Koreans fled to the south (Sholte, 2014).  
Kim Il-Sung became obsessed with reunifying the Koreas under the rule of communism. With considerable military 
support from the USSR, North Korea prepared for war to unify the peninsula by force (Peck, 2016). By 1950, Kim Il-Sung had 
amassed enough offensive military capabilities, especially in its numerical superiority in armored tanks, mechanized vehicles, 
artillery, and combat aircraft, which permitted him to plan and execute a surprise invasion south. On June 25, 1950, North 
Korea initiated its attack and within just three days captured Seoul, the South’s capital city. Upon learning of this military 
aggression, the United Nations (UN) Security Council voted to respond militarily, with sixteen nations providing troop 
support—with the overwhelming majority coming from the US (Sholte, 2014). The war started with the UN employing 
defensive tactics and after nearly a month of heavy fighting around the Pusan Perimeter that denied the North Korean military 
its final objective, President Truman and General Douglas MacArthur shifted to an offensive strategy after building enough 
forces for a counterattack. They aimed to liberate the entire peninsula of communist influence, and by October 1950, the UN 
forces actually were able to push the North Korean military to the Yalu River which bordered China. However, China threatened 
the US with a full-scale war if a cease-fire failed to materialize (History.com Staff, 2009). Between October and December of 
1950, an estimated 250,000 to 300,000 Chinese soldiers slipped into Korea to resist MacArthur’s advances, and as a result, the 
UN troops were forced to retreat from overwhelming Chinese counterattacks (Fehrenbach, 1963). On July 27, 1953, the UN 
agreed to a cease-fire with China and North Korea. However, to this day, North and South Korea have yet to sign a treaty that 
officially puts an end to the Korean War (Sholte, 2014). 
Today, over 24 million North Koreans reside in relative darkness and isolation. When looking at the Korean peninsula 
at night from satellite imagery, North Korea stands in stark contrast to the lights that shine brightly across the major cities of 
China and South Korea which are connected to the rest of the global community via the Internet. North Koreans live in a caste 
system of 51 categories, and only the top castes enjoy suitable living conditions. Prison camps, similar to Nazi death camps, 
serve as societal rehabilitation centers intended to re-educate an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 North Koreans whom the regime 
has deemed as being disloyal and contaminated (Sholte, 2014). North Korea is currently controlled by Kim Jong-Un, the 
grandson of Kim Il-Sung. However, little is known of Kim Jong-Un because of the closed borders of the Hermit Kingdom. 
What is known is that he grew up while his father, Kim Jong-Il, ruled over North Korea. Many Korean experts did not think 
Kim Jong-Un was in the running for succeeding his father because of the existence of an older brother and older half-brother. 
Yet within a few months into his reign after his father’s death in December of 2011, Kim Jong-Un conducted a satellite launch 
that many nations considered to be a test of an inter-continental ballistic missile that could target the US mainland. As a result, 
the UN Security Council imposed a new round of economic sanctions on the rogue nation (Profile: Kiim Jong-Un, North 
Korea's Supreme Commander, 2016).  
Unfortunately, in spite of such repeated punitive measures imposed on the nation, the North Korean regime has 
continued to provoke international condemnation and frustrate the UN, especially with advancements in North Korea’s 
asymmetric military capabilities. Since October 2006, North Korea has conducted five nuclear tests—the most recent being a 
detonation of an estimated 10-kiloton warhead in September of 2016 (Hunt, Kwon, & Hanna, 2016). North Korea’s offensive 
cyber program has also caused serious concerns for globally connected world. North Korea is credited with the cyberattack on 
Sony Pictures in 2014 (Orr, 2015) and is thought to have committed a cyber heist of nearly $81 million from the Bangladesh 
central bank in 2016 (Arnold, 2016). To further solidify his rule, Kim Jong-Un is also thought to have orchestrated and ordered 
the 2017 assassination of his half-brother in a Malaysia airport using VX nerve agent (Bondarenko, 2017). 
The international community has failed to come up with lasting measures that dissuade and deter the North Korea 
regime from continuing to threaten global peace and stability. Along with its nuclear tests and extensive hacking programs, 
North Korea has built a considerable conventional military force that has more soldiers, artillery pieces, battle tanks, and 
submarines than South Korea (Browne, 2016). It also has stockpiles of chemical munitions and has amassed one of the world’s 
largest biological weapons arsenal (Kaplan, 2006). China, arguably its sole remaining ally, does not approve of North Korea’s 
hostile overtures and has opposed its nuclear program from the beginning (Bandow, 2017). Perhaps an even more worrisome 
dilemma the international community must deal with is collapse within North Korea itself—if the North Korean regime should 
unexpectedly fall, this would likely trigger a civil war within the north at best, or perhaps possibly initiate the release of nuclear 
weapons at worst.  In this paper, the authors encourage those who wish to better understand and model the complexities of 
North Korean to leverage system dynamics as a foreign policy tool. Furthermore, the authors demonstrate how system dynamics 
can be used to propose more effective options to help the international community resolve the North Korean dilemma. 
 
1.2 System Dynamics as a Foreign Policy Tool 
 
System dynamics started with philosophers, scientists, and management experts advocating for a systematic way of 
thinking in order to describe the complexities of the world (Sterman, 2000). This process is intended to enhance the 
understanding of complex systems by attempting to describe problems through their connections to their environment. This 
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analytical technique is more effective when it involves interdisciplinary research because of the many different domains 
typically associated with real-world systems and problems. Although this process originated as a way to mathematically model 
complex structures, John Sterman, one of the leading experts on system dynamics, emphasizes that the tool can be applied to 
human behavior, physical systems, and technical systems, while also drawing on social and technical sciences (2000).  
The five steps of the system dynamics modeling process provide a roadmap for using the tool for modeling a problem. 
The first phase is the problem articulation phase, where the boundaries of the project are selected. The second phase is the 
dynamic hypothesis, where the initial predictions are stated. The third phase is the formulation phase, which involves making 
the model and setting up the parameters. The fourth phase is testing, which is running a model through various simulations and 
specifications. The fifth and last phase is policy formulation and evaluation, which involves making future recommendations 
from the results (Sterman, 2000). This paper walks through the modeling steps of phases 1 and 2, and it concludes with future 
recommendations and work. The authors believe this paper will introduce and acquaint readers on the viability of employing 
system dynamics on complex real-world problems. Ultimately, the authors hope that this paper will encourage further multi-
disciplinary research that helps the international community resolve the North Korean dilemma once and for all. 
 
2. Problem Articulation 
 
2.1 Key Variables 
 
Concerning the North Korea dilemma, there exist an unlimited number of variables that one can think of in describing 
North Korea’s relationship to the rest of the world. In the first phase of the system dynamics modeling process, the very first 
step is to identify the system’s most important variables (Sterman, 2000). These key variables serve help to identify the most 
important factors and relationships in the system. In this paper, the authors identify a handful of key variables that adequately 
characterize the North Korean dilemma. The first is North Korean power, and the second is the likeliness of North Korea 
attacking the US or South Korea. The likelihood of a new round of international sanctions is also an important variable, for it 
directly relates toward countering the power of North Korea. North Korea’s probability of conducting an additional nuclear 
test serves as important variable in describing one of the most critical problems the international community has with North 
Korea. China’s support is another important variable concerning the North Korean dilemma, since the North relies on China 
not only as an ally but for economic trade as well. Kim Jong-Un’s power is an important factor, as is the US’ willingness to 
assert its power. Lastly, the amount of dissenters within North Korea and the amount of North Korean loyalists are both 
important factors. Clearly, there are an infinite number of additional variables that impact the North Korean dilemma, but the 
authors select these as most critical for building a system dynamics model that improves overall understanding of the problem. 
 
2.2 Reference Modes 
 
Reference modes are a valuable system dynamics tool. They translate the descriptions of variables into a graphical interpretation 
using time as a reference mode to better visualize incremental and sequential changes in the system (Sterman, 2000). In this 
section of the paper, the authors select the key variable of China’s support to North Korea for analysis. Ever since China sent 
its military forces in support of the North during the Korean War, China has been North Korea’s most significant ally 
(History.com Staff, 2009). Figure 1 highlights the growth in trade from 2000 to 2010 between the two nations. China is one of 
the only remaining nations to support North Korea with economic and energy assistance even after the North’s continued 
nuclear tests. Although they remain allies, China has also made declarations against the North Korean nuclear program. 
Regarding the peninsula, the Chinese government is greatly concerned about averting a resumption of a full-scale conflict and 
North Korea’s nuclear program which both cause difficulties for China (Albert & Xu, 2017). 
 
In spite of international pressures on China to exert more of its influence against further North Korean provocations, 
China does also desire a denuclearized North Korea and has declared commitments to decrease trade with the Kim Jong-Un 
regime. Figure 2 shows variations in the potential trade volume over the next 3 years between the two countries depending on 
North Korea’s willingness to denuclearize. The difference between a conservative trade estimate and the baseline projection of 
a nuclearized North Korea is over $10 billion per year by 2020, and approximately $30 billion in cumulative trade from 2017 
to 2020 (Snyder, 2013).  
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Figure 1: Historical China and North Korea Trade Volume (Albert & Xu, 2017) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Scenarios for Future China and North Korea Trade (Snyder, 2013) 
 
This economic analysis is merely one reference mode that foreign policy makers can use to make better sense of the North 
Korean dilemma. Each identified key variable can also be further analyzed to examine current and projected future behavior 
that can have an important role in the dynamics surrounding North Korea. What is important to highlight for the analysis in 
this paper is that the relationship between North Korea and China plays an integral part in describing the North Korean dilemma. 
 
3. Dynamic Hypothesis Testing 
 
The purpose of dynamic hypothesis testing is to model the system as a whole in an effort to see how key variables 
interact with one another. This involves generating an initial hypothesis as well as mapping. Mapping involves developing 
visualizations of causal structures based on initial hypotheses (Sterman, 2000). In this paper, the mapping will be used to show 
the key relationships that define the North Korean dilemma. 
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3.1 Causal Loop Diagrams 
 
A causal loop diagram is a mapping technique that captures feedback dependency. The arrows in a diagram indicate 
a causal relationship. If an arrow is pointed from variable A to variable B, variable B would be dependent on variable B. 
Positive or negative signs reside at the tip of each arrow. A positive sign indicates a positive effect (variable B increases when 
variable A increases). A negative sign indicates a negative effect (variable B decreases when variable A increases). In a causal 
loop diagram, the polarity is calculated by multiplying the signs together. If the value is positive, the system contains reinforcing 
(R) or positive feedback. If the value is negative, the system contains balancing (B) or negative feedback (Sterman, 2000). 
Figure 3 shows an example of a positive reinforcing feedback loop. As North Korea’s power increases, North Korea’s 
likeliness to attack increases as well, and as North Korea’s likeliness to attack increases, North Korea’s power increases. At 
the same time, as North Korea’s power decreases, North Korea’s likeliness to attack decreases. This is an extremely dangerous 
predicament because North Korea could potentially increase its power exponentially while at the same time increasing in its 
likelihood of attack (Kaplan, 2006). In order to mitigate the threat and decrease the potential for attack, the US and allied 
nations must consider policy actions that impede the North Korea regime from increasing its power. The future behavior of 
North Korea’s likeliness to attack will increase with the growth of its power. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Positive Reinforcing Feedback Loop Resulting in Exponential Growth/Decline in Power (Sterman, 2000) 
 
On the other hand, Figure 4 displays a balancing feedback loop. As the US becomes more willing to assert power in 
the form of economic sanctions or military threats, North Korea becomes more inclined to decrease further nuclear tests. 
However, as North Korea decreases nuclear testing, the need for additional US sanctions and military threats decrease as well. 
The introduction of the two lines on these arrows represent time delays, which cause corrective actions to continue even after 
the initial activities occur in time (Sterman, 2000). The result of this causal loop diagram is an oscillating line in which the 
measured variable increases and decreases over a span of time. Because the feedback loop is balancing, North Korea’s nuclear 
tests increase and decrease as time progresses depending on the level of military threats and economic sanctions it has at a 
certain point in time. Certain sanctions, for instance, make it harder for North Korea to assemble the materials and resources 
needed to create a hydrogen bomb, but as it finds ways to thwart international sanctions, North Korea finds a way to initiate 
and complete a nuclear test (Moon & Park, 2016). Accordingly, this balancing feedback loop suggests that an effective way to 
stymie future North Korea nuclear tests is to apply constant and consistent external pressure.  
Figure 5 provides a more complex feedback model that describes Kim Jong-Un’s power, which involves both a 
reinforcing and balancing loop. The balancing loop models Kim Jong-Un’s power positively affecting the US’ willingness to 
assert power which, in turn, positively affects North Korea’s instability. As a result, this negatively affects China’s support to 
the US actions, positively affecting North Korea’s economy, and finally positively affecting Kim Jong-Un’s power. The 
reinforcing loop involves Kim Jong-Un’s power positively affecting the willingness for the US to assert power, since the US 
would want to place in check a rise in the regime’s power. Willingness for the US to assert power positively affects North 
Korea’s instability, for North Korea would not be in a secure power position. Finally, as North Korea’s instability goes up, 
Kim Jong-Un’s power would go up as well because he is able to feed off of the instability as a power assertion for more North 
Korean military capabilities.  
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Figure 4: Balancing Feedback Loop Resulting in Oscillation (Sterman, 2000) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Balancing and Reinforcing Loop Resulting in S-Shaped Growth (Sterman, 2000) 
 
Overall, there exists an s-shaped curve describing how Kim Jong-Un’s power directly impacts stability for the region. 
At the start of the curve—when Kim Jong-Un first became the North Korean ruler—his power was at the lowest point, and the 
overall stability for the region was actually fairly stable as the new regime focused on securing internal control within North 
Korea. This is represented by the reinforcing loop and the exponentially increasing portion of the graph in Figure 5. The middle 
of the s-shaped curve highlights a tipping point where Kim Jong-Un solidifies control over his own people and flexes North 
Korea’s military strength externally towards foreign adversaries. This inflection point indicates where Kim Jong-Un gains the 
highest rate of change in power for his regime, and up until this period of time the reinforcing feedback loop holds greater 
impact over the balancing feedback loop. After the inflection point, the international community responds more forcefully to 
North Korean military provocations, and this is where the balancing feedback loop begins to exert more influence over the 
reinforcing feedback loop resulting in the greatest degree of instability for peace and security (Sterman, 2000). Interestingly, 
the s-shaped curve does also reveal that if Kim Jong-Un is able to truly secure complete power over North Korea and truly 
convince the world of the futility in fighting against North Korea’s military might, stability in the region does improve. 
However, the authors assess that Kim Jong-Un’s current struggles for control and power has not yet reached this tipping point—
as a result, North Korean provocations continue to spark global unrest and security concerns throughout the world. The authors 
also assert that in order to restore the region to greater levels of stability, the best courses of action would be to reduce the 
regime’s power rather than to allow Kim Jong-Un to consolidate even greater power. Although modeling this problem with 
system dynamics does show how a competing set of foreign policy directives can be implemented to achieve eventual peace 
and stability for the two Koreas, the authors believe that the risks in conducting activities that lead to even greater instability 
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for the region will likely lead to a resumption of conflict on the peninsula that will engulf other nations embroiled in the North 
Korean dilemma.  
 
3.2 Stock and Flow Diagram 
 
A stock and flow diagram is another effective tool that one can use to model a causal loop diagram with even greater 
fidelity. For this type of visual model, the squares in the diagram represent quantifiable stocks of resources key to the dynamic 
modeling, the straight lines represent the flow of those resources between key tasks, the valves on the straight lines represent 
the pressure points where one can speed up or slow down the flow of resources, and the arrows represent causal relationships 
(Sterman, 2000). Figure 6 updates the previous causal loop diagrams previously modeling in this paper with the addition of a 
number of key stocks and flows.  
The system starts with a birth rate connected to a new susceptible population of North Koreans that are either 
supporting Kim Jong-Un and his government or that part of the population susceptible to defecting. The first flow from the 
susceptible population is the conformity rate, which results in a stock consisting of the conformed population. This population 
is supportive of Kim Jong-Un, and this population stock increases Kim Jong-Un’s power. Kim Jong-Un’s level of power then 
adjusts through the progression of those key variables identified earlier for the causal loop diagrams in Figures 3 to 5. As the 
conformed population rises, the conforming rate rises as well since it positively affects Kim Jong-Un’s power. The second 
important flow from the susceptible population is the dissatisfaction rate, or the rate of people that are unhappy with the current 
regime. This ends with a stock labeled as the dissatisfied population. The dissatisfied population has two options: it can 
transform through a revolutionary rate into the revolutionary population stock which has the potential to rebel against the ruling 
order, or can become part of the dissatisfied population stock that progresses through the departure rate, becomes part of the 
defector population stock, and then finally leaves the system via defection. Figure 6 shows the overall stock and flow diagram 
that represents the North Korean people, and this model helps to convey how those in the lower castes and most dissatisfied 
with the regime can potentially organize into a revolt or popular movement against Kim Jong-Un (Sholte, 2014). 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Stock and Flow Diagram of North Korean Dilemma (Sterman, 2000) 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
It is important to note that the Korean War has not ended because no formal peace treaty exists on the Korean 
peninsula. While a fragile ceasefire has endured for over six decades, the 1953 Armistice Agreement remains tenuous. 
Furthermore, North Korean provocations through its conventional military as well as its asymmetric warfighting capabilities 
have repeatedly stymied reconciliation and hopes for eventual peace between the two Koreas. This paper leverages system 
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dynamics and its many tools to help better explain key relationships that define the continuing conflict on the Korean peninsula, 
and encourages foreign policy experts to explore its use to come up with even better options for dealing effectively with the 
Kim Jong-Un regime. Admittedly, this paper provides a very simplistic view of the dilemma the international community faces 
in its dealings with North Korea. However, the main intent of this paper is to demonstrate how fairly straight-forward system 
dynamics can be in helping to model, understand, and formulate better solutions for dealing with such a complex problem that 
is North Korea. It is through the articulation of the problem, the identification of key variables, and the tools of mapping that 
the authors believe the international community can develop more consistent policies that can promote better decision-making 
against North Korean provocations. Finally, the authors encourage additional research into this topic, especially with regards 
to simulation and testing analysis using more quantifiable inputs in order to analyze the individual effect of all identified key 
variables. Through such analysis, the authors believe that policy makers will be able to come up with better solutions to help 
resolve the North Korean dilemma. 
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